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Abstract 
The demographic dividend is the window of opportunity provided by changes in the 
age structure of a population. It occurs because of the decline of both fertility and 
mortality rates. Data from the World Bank are used for descriptive statistics, 
regression analyzes with and without robust standard-errors, in addition to performing 
Granger-Causality tests. The results indicate that estimated time trends for fertility 
and mortality are significantly decreasing for Arab countries. Findings also indicate 
that the demographic dividend has occurred in the recent decade in most of Arab 
countries except for Egypt. This paper shows also the causal links between the 
dependency ratio (change in the population age structure) and the working age 
population, unemployment, economic development, government and private 
expenditures on health and education, education, and female participation in 
education variables.  
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Introduction: 
Economies today are more globalized and open to migration in addition to 
technological and institutional innovation. While most economies have been 
benefiting from low fertility and mortality rates, others are still seeking to benefit 
from the shifts that allow demographic dividends with their likely impact on 
economic development. 
Recent studies on the demographic dividend analyzed groups of countries with 
different income levels, and indicate that low and upper middle income countries are 
still facing the beginning of this window of opportunity, which is not the case of high 
income economies (Lee and Mason, 2012). Contributions also indicate that the 
demographic transition in emerging countries benefited only Russia, India, and China, 
but not Brazil (Berlin Institute, 2012; Stampe, Porsse, and Portugal, 2011; Brito and 
Carvalho, 2013) while in developed countries, gains and economic growths account 
for values that ranges from 5 to 45% (Mason, 2005; Lee & Mason, 2006; 2010; 
Mason & Lee, 2007; 2011). But for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, they did not take 
advantage from the demographic dividend, as they need reforms to enhance the 
human capital (Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu, 2014; Loewe, 2007). 
During these recent decades, Arab countries have been through a demographic 
transition. This latter is characterized by the shift from higher rates of fertility as well 
as higher rates of mortality to lower values, and resulted in a switch from population 
with large base pyramids, or expansive pyramids, to either constructive or stationary 
base.  
The population size of Arab countries has been growing over the past decades. This is 
mainly because of the combined effects of the less rapidly declining fertility rates and 
the rapidly decreasing mortality rates. This is likely to continue in the near future 
according to population forecasts of the World Bank (2016). 
These demographic changes are referred to as demographic dividend or demographic 
window of opportunity, as more resources are allocated for younger generations in 
education and health besides higher labor supply. This population transition can 
achieve rapid economic growth when the dependency ratio, which is the ratio of the 
non-active population divided by the active population, reaches lower values. 
Recent research has been debating the influence of the age structure of a given 
population on a macroeconomic level. For this, Bloom and Canning (2004) 
demonstrates through a cross-country analysis that a promising age structures impact 
the increase of income per capita as well as income growth. 
The current research focuses on providing the potential magnitude of the occurrence 
of the demographic dividend in Arab economies besides analyzing the effect of the 
population change on educational and macroeconomic variables. 
The questions that could be raised at this stage of the research are: 
 Are the trends of fertility rates and mortality rates significantly decreasing in 
Arab economies? 
 Do Arab population dynamics result in the occurrence of demographic 
dividend? 
 Do the demographic transitions in these countries impact economic growth, 
educational, and social variables? 
This paper introduces a literature review of the demographic dividend. This is 
followed by the selected theoretical framework that is used for the empirical methods 
applied to the data mobilized. The results of the fertility and mortality trends, the 
estimation of the demographic dividend, and the causalities by the population change 
in Arab countries are introduced. The last part of the paper focuses on an overall 
discussion and conclusion.  
I. Literature Review: 
Kirk (1996) discusses the change of population structure in its theory of demographic 
transition that occurs when countries have decreasing rates of fertility and decreasing 
rates of mortality. This change in the population composition generates an economic 
opportunity of growth, as there will be fewer needs for investments to meet the 
youngest segment and thus the remaining resources will be targeting family welfare 
and economic development (Ross, 2004).  
Galor and Weil (2000) indicate that within each country, the demographic transition 
has many stages. The first stage is noticeable when the population growth becomes 
negatively correlated with the economic development. This is followed by a decline in 
child mortality besides the decrease of fertility rate. At this latter stage, the children 
are perceived as “consumption” rather than “investment”, and greater emphasis 
targets the quality of health and education, which increase the productivity on the 
longer run (Rosenzweig, 1990; Soares, 2005). 
The contributions of Bloom, Williamson (1998) and Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 
(2003) indicate that any change in the age composition of a population within a 
country can have an impact on its economic performance (Williamson and Higgins, 
2001; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2003). Findings also indicate that if the growth 
rate of the active population is higher than the growth rate of the overall population, it 
impacts the economic development positively due to a higher labor supply (Bloom et 
al, 2013; Bloom and Canning, 2003). 
The contributions of Lee (2003) and Galor (2005) show that the increase in the active 
population results in a decrease of the number of dependents –the populations of the 
age groups between 0-15 and 60 years or more- within economies. This leads to an 
enhancement in the economic outputs, savings, and investments. Bloom et al. (2009), 
Soares and Falcao (2008) indicate that this demographic transition also supports 
female participation in the labor market besides savings. 
Some authors indicate that the demographic transition is the key driver of the success 
of some Asian countries (Bloom et al., 2000; Mason, 2001) while others expect that 
this is yet to take place in Africa (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Bloom et al., 2003). 
The demographic transition leads to achieving the demographic dividend (Carvalho 
and Wong, 1999; Pool, 2007). But in order to achieve this window of opportunity, 
proper policies are of prime importance, as without monitoring and adapting these 
policies on the population change, social risks and unemployment may occur (Bloom 
and Canning, 2000; Bloom et al., 2003, 2007; Lorentzen et al., 2008). 
Contributions have been done to test for the occurrence of the demographic dividends 
in many economies. In the case of India, the change in the population composition has 
occurred, but it is not homogeneous among all of its states (Thakur, 2012; 
Drummond, Thakur, Yu, 2014). Findings also indicate the impact between the change 
in the age structure and economic development is conditioned by the presence of good 
policies and how the BIMARU states are willing to reform their economy. But 
Majumder (2013) assesses the link between the demographic transition and youth 
unemployment. Results indicate that if the Indian policy makers do not relook at the 
human capital development, education, and skill formation, the demographic 
opportunity will turn into a threat. 
Ven and Smits (2011) assess the demographic dividend in 39 developing countries. 
Findings indicate that the demographic transition is currently occurring in developing 
countries with higher rates than developed countries. In addition to that, a high ratio 
of working age population relative to total population positively affects the economic 
growth while it is the opposite of a high ratio of youth or elderly dependency ratio. 
The contribution of Medina and Chager (2015) uses panels data model to analyze the 
elements to be prioritized in the African political agendas to take advantage from the 
demographic dividend as well as to reduce poverty. Results indicate that the Sub-
Saharan Africa needs to enhance the employability and human capital throughout 
education, foster women participation in the job market, besides enhancing health 
conditions. Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu (2014) support these latter findings.  
In the case of Arab countries, some contributions (United Nations, 2003; El-Khouri, 
2016; Crane et al., 2011; Englelhardt and Schulz, 2017) indicate a descriptive analysis 
of the patterns of the demographic change in Arab economies. They also indicate the 
patterns of the death rates, birth rates, population growth, international migration, 
fertility rates, and life expectancy besides the trends of the share of the young 
population.  
The United Nations (2016) introduces the occurrence of the demographic dividend in 
Arab regions. This contribution estimates the time span, or the opening and closing 
year, of this window of opportunity. For Morocco, Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia the 
opening year of the demographic dividend is 1981, while the closing year is 2019 for 
Tunisia, 2021 for Algeria, and 2025 for Morocco and Libya.  
Still, there is a lack of contributions that are directly linked to the demographic 
dividends in Arab economies besides the lack of contributions that analyze the impact 
of the demographic transitions on economic, social, and educational variables. 
II. Theoretical Framework: 
The theoretical framework introduces the demographic transition theory, followed by 
the definition of the demographic dividend. The last part of this section introduces the 
theoretical model of the relationship between the income per capita and economic 
growth, which is the basis of the demographic dividend simulation. 
The demographic transition theory was first introduced by Kirk (1996) and defines 
the evolution or modernization of societies from the pre-modern regime to a post-
modern. This is explained by the transition from higher rates of fertility and mortality 
rates to lower ones besides the increase in life expectancy in a given country. Every 
country experiences this phenomenon at different time periods. It first started in North 
Western Europe followed by the Eastern and Southern Europe. But for low-income 
countries, or developing countries, this demographic transition did not take place until 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Lee, 2003). 
The contributions of Kirk (1996), Lee (2003), and Davis (1963) divide the 
demographic transition into three main stages. The most important characteristics of 
the first stage are the high fertility rate and high mortality rate. This is followed by the 
decline of mortality, as a result of health enhancement besides the improvements of 
agriculture and transports. The final phase is characterized by a decrease in fertility 
rates. 
The population pyramid has different forms in each of these stages. At the beginning, 
it has a long base, as the median population age is very young. At the second stage, it 
becomes flatter at its top and the number of young dependents increase. But when 
fertility rate decreases, the population growth is kept at check, and the median age 
population becomes higher. 
The demographic shift or demographic transition due to the decreasing rates of 
mortality and fertility can lead to the demographic dividend, which is benefiting from 
the change of the population composition to reach an accelerated economic growth 
due to the larger share of the active population and decreasing trends of the number of 
total dependents within the country (Gribble & Bremner, 2012). 
In addition to that, the demographic dividend can also be explained by the 
reallocation of governments’ expenditures and savings. 
The population in a given country is divided into many age-group categories. If we 
assume that there are only three main sub-groups that are S1, S2 and S3 at the time 
period t1, these sub-populations size are going to be subject to a change in a different 
period of time to be 𝑆1
′ , 𝑆2
′ , and 𝑆3
′  at t2. 
The shift of each group size is defined by a change that is represented by the given 
formula: 
∆𝑛=
𝑆𝑛
′ − 𝑆𝑛
𝑆𝑛
 
This change suggests that in the case of ∆1 and ∆2 are negative, the younger 
population at t1 has more education, more health expenditure, and more consumption. 
This also indicates that the decrease of the population size of these groups will result 
in more government savings for that country, which will enhance the education and 
the health for the younger generations at t2. 
The demographic dividend is a phenomenon that has a limited period of time, because 
as the large active or adult population will move to the oldest segment, there will be 
less cohort that were born during the period of the declining fertility, and concern will 
relate to taking care of the elderly (Ross, 2004). 
Some contributions indicate that the demographic dividend needs to be accompanied 
by good policy choices so that economies can take advantage from it rather than being 
subject to economic and social threats such as unemployment. Bloom et al. (2002) 
indicates that in order to translate the demographic into a gift for any economy, there 
should be a prioritization of some variables such as health, education, and family 
planning. This depends only on the institutional environment and the established 
policies. 
The estimation of the relationship between the per capita income and economic 
growth is borrowed from the model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2004). This 
model is used in several other contributions (Mody & Aiyar, 2011; Bloom and 
Canning, 2004). 
The model uses a conditional convergence equation to derive this relationship by the 
use of the following formula: 
𝑔𝑧 = 𝜆(𝑧
∗ − 𝑧0) 
Where: 
𝑧∗: is the steady state of the income per worker; 
𝑧0: is the initial income per worker; 
𝑔𝑧: is the growth of income per capita; 
and 𝜆: is the speed in which the country converges to its steady state level. 
As the steady state of income per worker is defined by the use of many variables that 
impact the productivity, the formula is rearranged to be: 
(1)          𝑔𝑧 = 𝜆(𝑥𝛽 − 𝑧0) 
x represents all the variables that affect the workers’ productivity and 𝛽 represents its 
corresponding coefficients. 
Bloom and Canning (2004) theorized the relationship between the working age 
population or active population and the economic growth using variables of interest. 
This latter model is given in the following formula: 
(2)          
𝑌
𝑁
=
𝑌
𝐿
𝐿
𝑊𝐴
𝑊𝐴
𝑁
 
where the GDP per capita is written in terms of total income (Y) divided by the total 
population (N). This formula is further expanded in terms of labor force (L) and 
working age population (WA). 
When substituting for: 
log⁡(
𝑌
𝑁
) = 𝑦; log (
𝑌
𝐿
) = 𝑧; log (
𝐿
𝑊𝐴
) = 𝑝; log⁡(
𝑊𝐴
𝑁
) = 𝑤 
Formula (2) becomes: 
𝑦 = 𝑧 + 𝑝 + 𝑤 
Assuming the labor force absorption rate, or the labor force divided by the working 
age, is constant, the formula in terms of growth is: 
(3)          𝑔(𝑦) = 𝑔(𝑧) + 𝑔(𝑤) 
When substituting formula 1 and 2 into 3, the resulted formula explains the per capita 
income in terms of initial and growth rate of the working age share, initial and growth 
rate of the per capita income besides many human productivity factors. Thus the 
formula will be: 
𝑔(𝑦) = 𝜆(𝑥𝛽 − 𝑧0) + 𝑔(𝑤) 
(4)           𝑔(𝑦) = 𝜆(𝑥𝛽 + 𝑝 + 𝑤0 − 𝑧0) + 𝑔(𝑤) 
Equation 4 is the basis of the empirical estimation. The assumptions to be made, 
relate to savings and health. This means that the working population has positive 
savings while the dependents, either young or old, spend more than they earn. In 
addition to that, the working population is considered to be healthier than the other 
remaining segments. For this, these variables will not be captured. Aiyar and Mody 
(2013) estimate the specification forms using the following formula: 
(5)          𝑔(𝑦𝑡) = 𝜌 ln(𝑦𝑡) + 𝛽1 ln(𝑤𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑔(𝑤𝑡)) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑔(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) is the dependent variable, which is the growth rate of per capita income, 𝑓𝑡 is 
the time invariant fixed effect, 𝜂𝑡 is a time dummy that captures the effects unique to 
the decade beginning in year t. 
Considering the counterfactual where there is no change in the working age ratio 
between the base period t=0 and t+n, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤0, and 𝑔(𝑤𝑡) = 0. This can be written 
such as: 
(6)          𝑔(𝑦𝑡) = 𝜌 ln(𝑦𝑡) + 𝛽1 ln(𝑤0) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
This model defines the demographic dividend as the difference between equation 5 
and equation 6, that is: 
𝐷𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽1(ln(𝑤𝑡) − ln(𝑤0)) + 𝛽2(𝑔(𝑤𝑡)) 
This demographic dividend (𝐷𝐷𝑡) represents the increment of per capita income that 
is attributed to the change in the age structure. 
III. Empirical Investigation 
1. Data and methods: 
This paper aims at identifying the demographic dividend in Arab countries with 
comparison to ECE countries. For this, this contribution is divided into three parts. 
The first part relates to the analysis of the trends of both fertility and mortality per 
1000 infant rates. This is through two regression models that are given such as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖 + 𝜀 
Where: 
Y: is the independent variable, which represents years, 
𝛼: the intercept, 
𝛽: the coefficient that corresponds to each variable, 
𝐹𝑖: fertility rate at year i, 
𝑀𝑖: mortality rate at year i, 
𝜀: standard error. 
The second part summarizes the estimations of the demographic dividend for Arab 
and ECE countries. Regressions of the theoretical model explained under the 
demographic dividend simulation section in this part are estimated with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
The data used for the simulation of the demographic dividend are GDP growth per 
year, log of the GDP per capita, log of the initial working age ratio, and the yearly 
growth of the working age ratio. 
The third part gives the results of the Granger causality test that enables the prediction 
of the causality between two variables in a sense where a variable enhance the 
accurateness of the forecast of the other variable. This section tests different sets of 
hypotheses and analyzes the causal links between the change in the population age 
structure that is represented by the dependency ratio, and social, educational, and 
macroeconomic variables.  
The data used are extracted from the World Bank and are of the period between 1960 
and 2016. The selected Arab countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, and Yemen, and the selected ECE countries 
are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia 
2. Hypotheses to be tested 
a. Granger causality between dependency ratio and employment variables: 
 H0: Total labor force does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause total labor force. 
 H0: Female labor force does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause female labor force. 
 H0: Total unemployment does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause total unemployment. 
 H0: Young female unemployment does not Granger cause dependency 
ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause young female 
unemployment. 
 H0: Young male unemployment does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause young male unemployment. 
 H0: Youth labor force participation does not Granger cause dependency 
ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause youth labor force 
participation. 
 
b. Granger causality between dependency ratio and economic development 
variables: 
 H0: GDP per capita does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause GDP per capita. 
 H0: GDP per capita growth does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause GDP per capita growth. 
 H0: Gross savings does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause gross savings. 
 H0: Agriculture value added does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause agriculture value added. 
 H0: Industry value added does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause industry value added. 
 
c.  Granger causality between dependency ratio and expenditure variables: 
 H0: Education expenditure does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause education expenditure. 
 H0: Health expenditure per capita does not Granger cause dependency 
ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause health expenditure per 
capita. 
 H0: Private health expenditure per capita does not Granger cause 
dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause private health expenditure 
per capita. 
 H0: Public health expenditure per capita does not Granger cause 
dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause public health expenditure 
per capita. 
 H0: Total health expenditure does not Granger cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause total health expenditure. 
 
d. Granger causality between dependency ratio and educational variables:  
 H0: Enrolment in primary education does not Granger cause dependency 
ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause enrolment in primary 
education. 
 H0: Enrolment in secondary education does not Granger cause enrolment 
in secondary education. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause enrolment in secondary 
education. 
 H0: Enrolment in secondary vocational education does not Granger cause 
dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause enrolment in secondary 
vocational education. 
 H0: Enrolment in secondary general education does not Granger cause 
dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause enrolment in secondary 
general education. 
 
e. Granger causality between dependency ratio and female participation in 
education variables: 
 H0: Female enrolment in primary education does not Granger cause 
dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause female enrolment in 
primary education. 
 H0: Female enrolment in secondary education does not Granger cause 
enrolment in secondary education. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause female enrolment in 
secondary education. 
 H0: Female enrolment in secondary vocational education does not Granger 
cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause female enrolment in 
secondary vocational education. 
 H0: Female enrolment in secondary general education does not Granger 
cause dependency ratio. 
HA: Dependency ratio does not Granger cause female enrolment in 
secondary general education. 
IV. Results 
Two major sets of results are respectively introduced. The first set focuses on the 
estimation of time trends in variables. The second set of results introduces the links 
between demographic, economic and social variables.  
I. Results for Time Trends in Variables 
The variables analyzed are fertility, mortality and demographic dividends.  
1. Fertility rates in Arab countries 
Table 1 shows the results of the trends of fertility rate in Arab countries. Findings 
indicate that all the resulted model for Arab countries are explained by an R-square 
0.713 and 0.982 and are significant. The trends of the fertility rate are significantly 
decreasing in all Arab countries with the lowest coefficients for Libya, Algeria, and 
Kuwait and the highest ones for Mauritania, Iraq, and Egypt. 
Table 1: Trend of fertility rate in Arab countries 
Country R-squared Intercept Fertility Rate 
Algeria 0.905 
8.565                                              
(48.926) 
-0.124                                    
(-22.625) 
Bahrain 0.972 
7.269                           
(92.159) 
-0.108                           
(-43.619) 
Egypt 0.930 
6.789                                            
(75.246) 
-0.076                               
(-26.803) 
Iraq 0.869 
7.467                             
(78.218) 
-0.057                               
(-18.949) 
Jordan 0.946 
 8.793                                      
(79.169) 
-0.107                     
(-30.622)  
Kuwait 0.884 
7.684                            
(40.945) 
-0.119                           
(-20.265) 
Lebanon 0.982 
5.722                               
(115.125) 
-0.085                           
(-54.245) 
Libya 0.893 
8.900                        
(45.821) 
-0.129                           
(-21.247) 
Mauritania 0.962 
7.186                                    
(187.074) 
-0045              
(-37.090) 
Morocco 0.959 
7.534                           
(77.885) 
-0.107                        
(-35.331) 
Oman 0.713 
9.004                              
(29.708) 
-0.110                               
(-11.589) 
Qatar 0.974 
7.701                                     
(98.067) 
-0.111                                
(-45.138) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.896 
8.414                                  
(55.838) 
-0.102                             
(-21.536) 
Sudan 0.883 
7.412                              
(93.777) 
-0.049                                      
(-20.176) 
Syria 0.941 
8.528                                  
(73.162) 
-0.107                         
(-29.266) 
Tunisia 0.939 
7.422                           
(57.933) 
-0.117                                 
(-29.041) 
UAE 0.979 
7.545                            
(104.154) 
-0.113                             
(-49.895) 
Palestine 0.965 
10.065                                    
(51.798) 
-0.113                           
(-25.363) 
Yemen 0.508 
8.984                             
(32.526) 
-0.065                                      
(-7.474) 
 
2. Mortality rates in Arab countries 
With regard to the trend of mortality per 1000 infants in Arab economies, they all 
have negative significant trends. Highest values of the coefficients of the trends are 
for Mauritania, Iraq and Yemen, meaning that these countries have lower decreasing 
rates than the remaining countries (Table 2). 
Table 2: Trend of mortality of infants (per 1000 infants) in Arab countries 
Country R-squared Intercept 
Mortality 
per 1000 
live births 
Algeria 0.892 
156.607                            
(35.138) 
-2.947                      
(-21.089) 
Bahrain 0.737 
80.824                                
(18.035) 
-1.727                              
(-12.290) 
Egypt 0.953 
190.941                                    
(54.834) 
-3.630                       
(-33.253) 
Iraq 0.842 
98.893                               
(33.518) 
-1.569                         
(-16.963) 
Jordan 0.872 
81.351                                  
(34.089) 
-1.432               
(-19.143) 
Kuwait 0.801 
68.964                               
(22.563) 
-1.413                     
(-14.748) 
Lebanon 0.991 
57.864                            
(141.467) 
-0.989                         
(-77.093) 
Libya 0.867 
122.037                                    
(29.698) 
-2.417              
(-18.762) 
Mauritania 0.915 
121.577                                    
(80.737) 
-1.139                    
(-24.126) 
Morocco 0.983 
142.001                       
(102.911) 
-2.385                           
(-55.139) 
Oman 0.844 
170.209                               
(23.056) 
-3.665                 
(-16.430) 
Qatar 0.897 
48.631                                 
(30.584) 
-0.886                  
(-19.568) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.866 
108.484                                 
(23.876) 
-2.041                   
(-16.259) 
Sudan 0.980 
107.269                          
(171.325) 
-1.021                         
(-52.038) 
Syria 0.889 
94.044                        
(33.954) 
-1.807                        
(-20.814) 
Tunisia 0.893 
141.904                        
(32.039) 
-2.794                          
(-20.681) 
UAE 0.755 
91.572                                   
(18.326) 
-2.021                    
(-12.900) 
Palestine 0.875 
79.883                                
(27.419) 
-1.274                            
(-16.319) 
Yemen 0.913 
247.359                                      
(38.741) 
-4.432            
(-22.977) 
 
 
3. Demographic Dividend 
Table 3 shows the coefficients of each of the variables from the model resulted from 
the robust standard error regression process. The log initial working age ratio and the 
growth rate of working age ratio coefficients are to be used in the estimation of the 
demographic dividend. 
Table 3: Coefficients obtained from the robust standard error regression 
analysis for Arab countries 
Country Intercept 
Log GDP 
per capita 
Log initial 
working age 
ratio 
Growth rate 
of working 
age ratio 
Algeria 1.894 -0.813 1.169 0.231 
Bahrain -141.601 -21.141 124.564 -0.969 
Egypt 23.491 0.424 -12.774 1.049 
Iraq -2.250 8.091 -10.932 -3.905 
Jordan 36.030 -12.205 4.406 -3.498 
Kuwait -134.186 -17.204 112.448 1.841 
Lebanon 134.287 4.306 -84.373 7.852 
Mauritania -256.248 -4.886 156.992 -3.716 
Morocco -56.241 -7.437 46.523 -0.314 
Oman -29.080 -13.211 47.900 -2.826 
Qatar -72.814 -5.422 51.162 1.495 
Saudi Arabia -153.787 -24.695 144.530 -3.847 
Sudan -160.092 5.540 86.003 -4.606 
Syria -15.450 -1.189 12.909 -1.468 
Tunisia -24.238 -4.103 21.718 2.389 
United Arab Emirates -32.815 20.413 -32.779 0.373 
Palestine 307.447 40.298 -255.883 5.261 
Yemen 401.306 21.248 -275.244 7.927 
 
The resulted demographic dividends are summarized in table 4. The selected basis 
year to compute the demographic dividend is the year 1960, and results are 
summarized to show the values of each 5 years. A negative value of the demographic 
dividend is interpreted such as there is no increment in the income per capita that is 
caused or attributed to the change of the working age population. But a positive value 
indicates the opposite.  
Findings divide Arab countries into two main categories that illustrate economies that 
still have the demographic dividend and countries that don’t. For Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, and Yemen, results 
indicate that the windows of opportunities that is caused by the population change no 
longer exist, as the latest years indicate a negative energy. But for Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia, the 
demographic dividend started in the years, 1975, 1978, 2005, 1980, 2008, 1960, 1986, 
2011, and 1969, respectively. For countries that are still experiencing the 
demographic dividend, there are countries that have increasing trends of its 
corresponding values while others face the opposite. This gives incentives about the 
countries that will either have longer periods to benefit from the demographic change 
or not. 
Findings indicate that all these economies have increasing trends except for Qatar, 
and Tunisia. 
Table 4: The demographic dividend in Arab countries 
Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Algeria -0.17 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.24 0.39 0.46 0.38 0.12 -0.06 
Bahrain -3.10 -3.34 0.70 5.67 7.35 7.86 9.49 10.56 12.94 17.00 17.65 
Egypt 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.10 -0.11 0.08 0.57 0.77 0.26 -0.85 -1.08 
Iraq 3.12 1.92 2.79 -0.44 -1.31 -0.76 -2.17 -1.97 -1.22 -0.79 -1.49 
Jordan 1.88 -0.95 -0.16 0.29 -2.83 -2.06 -6.43 -1.43 -0.97 -0.11 -1.35 
Kuwait -2.19 -7.59 -5.33 1.79 2.96 5.83 8.54 8.89 9.76 12.42 13.47 
Lebanon 2.13 6.81 5.01 -1.10 2.45 -0.75 -0.24 -2.29 -3.00 -4.04 -8.84 
Mauritania -0.62 -2.55 -3.28 -3.03 -2.58 -2.29 -2.09 -1.56 0.06 1.51 2.59 
Morocco -1.10 -1.46 -0.93 0.12 0.84 1.35 1.89 2.87 3.71 4.37 4.67 
Oman  -0.19 -1.14 -1.04 -0.62 -2.00 -4.55 0.46 -0.42 2.92 5.80 
Qatar 2.82 3.54 4.68 3.05 6.54 5.81 5.87 6.18 8.32 10.80 9.09 
Saudi Arabia -0.13 -0.46 -1.29 -0.45 -0.47 2.20 0.05 3.40 5.72 10.63 15.31 
Sudan -0.06 -0.27 -0.74 -1.90 -2.84 -2.39 -1.73 0.31 0.10 0.36 -0.34 
Syria 0.00 -0.74 -0.13 0.00 -0.66 -1.22 -1.36 -0.88 0.08 -0.46 1.90 
Tunisia -3.52 0.92 1.56 1.80 2.09 2.47 3.71 4.38 4.46 3.32 1.70 
United Arab Emirates -0.99 -2.65 -4.29 -4.62 -4.02 -3.57 -4.22 -4.78 -5.85 -6.95 -7.12 
Palestine      -0.31 0.23 1.53 -0.54 -6.61 -13.01 
Yemen 0.28 -1.74 1.99 11.43 14.62 18.49 23.43 21.08 16.42 6.47 -0.80 
 
II. Causalities of the dependency ratio and economic, educational, and 
social variables 
 
1. Causality tests of the dependency ratio and unemployment variables 
in Arab: 
Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 summarize the results of the Granger causality test of the 
dependency ratio and employment variables in Arab countries. Under a level of 
significance of 5%, Algeria indicates that the dependency ratio causes the females 
labor force, causes the total unemployment, and causes the participation of youth in 
the labor force. This latter variable also causes the dependency ratio. But for Bahrain, 
the total labor force, the female labor force, and the participation of youth in the total 
labor force cause the dependency ratio. Egypt does not show any causalities under a 
5% significance level. But for Iraq, the dependency ratio causes the female labor force 
(Table 5). 
Table 5: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and employment variables in 
Arab countries (set1): 
Country 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 LABORFORCETOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 2.379 0.118  6.993 0.005  0.769 0.476  1.253 0.306 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCETOTAL 
 2.918 0.077  2.768 0.086  2.477 0.109  1.627 0.221 
 LABORFORCEFEMALE does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 3.423 0.052  3.591 0.046  0.270 0.765  3.139 0.065 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCEFEMALE 
 7.170 0.004  0.002 0.997  1.826 0.186  3.671 0.043 
 UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 3.509 0.050  1.271 0.303  0.808 0.460  1.253 0.308 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL 
 3.846 0.039  3.518 0.050  3.266 0.060  0.270 0.765 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 2.813 0.085  0.754 0.483  0.214 0.808  1.284 0.299 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE 
 3.267 0.060  0.633 0.541  0.360 0.702  0.066 0.936 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 3.126 0.067  1.279 0.301  0.449 0.644  1.201 0.322 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE 
 3.242 0.061  1.936 0.171  3.413 0.054  0.037 0.962 
 YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 4.095 0.032  6.759 0.005  0.210 0.812  0.491 0.618 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA 
 4.403 0.026  2.154 0.142  1.652 0.216  7.631 0.003 
 
For Jordan, there is a double causality between the total unemployment and the 
dependency ratio while also the unemployment of young males causes the 
dependency ratio. For Kuwait, the total labor force and the female labor force cause 
the dependency ratio. In the case of Lebanon, there is a double causality between the 
total labor force and the dependency ratio besides this latter variable that causes the 
young female unemployment and the participation of youth in the labor force. In 
Libya, the dependency ratio causes the total labor force, the female labor force, the 
young female unemployment, the young male unemployment, and has a double 
causality with the youth participation in the labor force (Table 6).  
Table 6: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and employment variables in 
Arab countries (set2): 
Country 
Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 LABORFORCETOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 2.96400 0.0746  6.25119 0.0106  7.13377 0.0046  1.61930 0.2229 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCETOTAL 
 0.49310 0.6180  2.40592 0.1241  18.4160 3.E-05  4.78290 0.0201 
 LABORFORCEFEMALE does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.20810 0.3197  4.49748 0.0295  1.76985 0.1960  0.96268 0.3989 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCEFEMALE 
 0.47370 0.6295  0.46131 0.6391  2.66138 0.0944  8.97422 0.0017 
 UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 3.85972 0.0392  0.45272 0.6443  0.13923 0.8709  1.03286 0.3751 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL 
 4.92437 0.0189  0.99004 0.3946  1.91509 0.1747  0.85468 0.4411 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 3.29803 0.0590  0.51890 0.6055  1.57644 0.2326  1.11905 0.3472 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE 
 1.71739 0.2063  0.92082 0.4196  4.81503 0.0203  4.44686 0.0261 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 4.11192 0.0328  0.69499 0.5145  0.26928 0.7668  1.31748 0.2912 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE 
 1.49753 0.2489  0.64545 0.5384  0.97478 0.3954  4.35622 0.0277 
 YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.07240 0.9304  1.49521 0.2558  1.02530 0.3768  3.95941 0.0356 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA 
 0.25305 0.7789  0.30145 0.7441  3.70837 0.0427  6.64354 0.0061 
 
For Mauritania, no causalities are found, but for Morocco, the dependency ratio 
causes the total unemployment, young females unemployment, young male 
unemployment, and youth participation in the labor force. In Oman, the dependency 
ratio has a double causality with the total labor force, is caused by both the female 
labor force and the total unemployment, and causes the participation of youth in the 
labor force. For Qatar, the female labor force and the young males unemployment 
cause the dependency ratio, which causes the participation of youth in the labor force 
(Table 7). 
 
 
Table 7: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and employment variables in 
Arab countries (set3): 
Country 
Mauritania Morocco Oman Qatar 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 LABORFORCETOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.98393 0.3912  0.44644 0.6461  5.96886 0.0093  1.92615 0.1718 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCETOTAL 
 0.10597 0.9000  1.44192 0.2600  17.7143 4.E-05  1.42331 0.2643 
 LABORFORCEFEMALE does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.17602 0.8399  1.35317 0.2811  5.67963 0.0111  4.48438 0.0246 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCEFEMALE 
 0.45293 0.6421  2.68464 0.0927  0.38931 0.6825  3.01959 0.0715 
 UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.57329 0.2332  0.06300 0.9391  3.78098 0.0415  0.08371 0.9200 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL 
 2.32695 0.1248  8.80318 0.0020  2.26933 0.1307  0.93356 0.4105 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.65983 0.2166  0.00602 0.9940  3.40634 0.0544  0.09578 0.9091 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE 
 2.14345 0.1447  5.82335 0.0107  2.94677 0.0768  0.98548 0.3915 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.48008 0.2527  0.01276 0.9873  3.15631 0.0655  4.58471 0.0237 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE 
 2.03345 0.1584  7.30144 0.0044  3.09002 0.0689  1.68774 0.2115 
 YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.02688 0.3762  1.10853 0.3495  0.91016 0.4185  0.37082 0.6948 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA 
 0.47509 0.6287  12.3103 0.0003  8.22951 0.0025  3.94972 0.0358 
 
In Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria, the dependency ratio causes the total labor force 
and the female labor force. In addition to that, the dependency ratio also causes the 
participation of youth in the labor force in Sudan and Syria. The dependency ratio 
causes the total labor force and the participation of youth in the labor force in Tunisia 
(Table 8). 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 8: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and employment variables in 
Arab countries (set4): 
Country 
Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Tunisia 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 LABORFORCETOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.02964 0.9708  0.01572 0.9844  0.18939 0.8289  2.65079 0.0952 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCETOTAL 
 4.16537 0.0307  6.37552 0.0072  7.10353 0.0047  4.24435 0.0291 
 LABORFORCEFEMALE does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.02984 0.9706  0.98655 0.3903  0.42632 0.6587  0.29755 0.7459 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCEFEMALE 
 6.72088 0.0059  6.89538 0.0053  8.50632 0.0021  1.84297 0.1842 
 UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 2.16616 0.1421  0.09940 0.9058  0.57682 0.5712  1.56413 0.2350 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL 
 0.21156 0.8112  2.96099 0.0760  1.84393 0.1854  1.18098 0.3285 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 2.14109 0.1450  0.01248 0.9876  0.76796 0.4778  1.07267 0.3619 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE 
 1.52980 0.2421  2.44738 0.1133  2.36057 0.1214  2.10180 0.1498 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.32108 0.7292  0.02503 0.9753  1.09756 0.3539  1.63608 0.2210 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE 
 1.43554 0.2627  2.49204 0.1094  2.99886 0.0738  2.13943 0.1452 
 YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.25958 0.7739  1.49193 0.2489  0.23755 0.7908  0.87151 0.4336 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA 
 1.20406 0.3208  6.36873 0.0072  5.22670 0.0149  4.12901 0.0315 
 
In the United Arab Emirates, the dependency ratio causes all unemployment and labor 
force variables except the female labor force. But in Palestine, the dependency ratio 
causes total labor force, has a double causality with the female labor force, and is 
caused by the participation of youth in the labor market. In the case of Yemen, the 
dependency ratio has a double causality with the total labor force and the young 
females unemployment and is caused by the female labor force, the total 
unemployment, and the participation of youth in the labor market (Table 9). 
Table 9: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and employment variables in 
Arab countries (set5): 
Country 
United Arab Emirates Palestine Yemen 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 LABORFORCETOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.60452 0.5560  4.98884 0.0175  3.67455 0.0437 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCETOTAL 
 8.13669 0.0026  1.46612 0.2546  6.87337 0.0053 
 LABORFORCEFEMALE does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.97080 0.1655  5.89189 0.0097  3.53901 0.0483 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
LABORFORCEFEMALE 
 2.38456 0.1178  4.84021 0.0193  2.12714 0.1454 
 UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.02806 0.3768  0.43938 0.6508  6.83202 0.0058 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTTOTAL 
 6.05255 0.0093  0.86914 0.4353  6.14295 0.0088 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.22771 0.3152  1.75505 0.1998  8.01779 0.0030 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGFEMALE 
 3.75634 0.0422  2.75257 0.0892  5.18518 0.0160 
 UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.27242 0.3030  0.82733 0.4524  2.46454 0.1118 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
UNEMPLOYMENTYOUNGMALE 
 6.00354 0.0095  1.40564 0.2696  0.29724 0.7463 
 YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.51061 0.6077  2.09788 0.1489  4.01742 0.0341 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
YOUTHLABORFORCEPARTICIPA 
 7.91117 0.0029  6.77374 0.0057  1.30675 0.2928 
 
2. Granger causality between the dependency ratio and economic 
development variables in Arab countries: 
Table 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 summarizes the causal links between the dependency 
ratio and economic development variables in Arab economies. 
The dependency ratio causes the GDP per capita growth and is caused by gross 
savings and agriculture value added. In Bahrain, the dependency ratio causes the 
agriculture value added, and is caused by the gross savings and the industry value 
added. In Egypt the dependency ratio only cause the industry value added. In the case 
of Jordan, the dependency ratio is caused by both the GDP per capita growth and the 
agriculture value added (Table 10). 
Table 10: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and economic development 
variables in Arab countries (set1): 
Country 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Jordan 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 GDPPERCAPITA does not Granger Cause 
DR 
0.55054 0.5801 1.05173 0.3623 1.46725 0.2403 0.27127 0.764 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITA 
0.92571 0.4029 0.42452 0.6581 1.0503 0.3574 0.45856 0.6359 
 GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.08416 0.9194 0.47491 0.6269 2.94406 0.062 5.67245 0.0075 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH 
4.11829 0.0222 0.65934 0.525 0.18199 0.8342 0.04271 0.9582 
 GROSSSAVINGS does not Granger Cause 
DR 
5.85945 0.0116 5.96396 0.007 0.48339 0.6211 0.0652 0.937 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GROSSSAVINGS 
0.98483 0.3938 0.91666 0.4115 1.7339 0.1928 1.03705 0.3658 
 AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED does not 
Granger Cause DR 
4.97861 0.0111 1.07429 0.37 2.54721 0.0895 6.13388 0.0044 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED 
0.2134 0.8086 5.37314 0.0199 0.55086 0.5803 1.78469 0.1795 
 INDUSTRYVALUEADDED does not 
Granger Cause DR 
1.74643 0.186 17.0558 0.0002 1.4984 0.2344 1.64624 0.2042 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
INDUSTRYVALUEADDED 
2.00606 0.1464 0.03836 0.9625 3.7075 0.0323 0.49738 0.6114 
 
In Kuwait, no causal links are found, Mauritania, the dependency ratio is caused by 
the GDP per capita growth, and in Morocco, the dependency ratio is caused by the 
industry value added. For Lebanon, the dependency ratio causes the GDP per capita, 
the GDP per capita growth, and has a double causality with the gross savings (Table 
11). 
Table 11: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and economic development 
variables in Arab countries (set2): 
Country 
Kuwait Lebanon Mauritania Morocco 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 GDPPERCAPITA does not Granger 
Cause DR 
1.27617 0.2911 2.59204 0.0975 1.2242 0.3027 1.44551 0.2466 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITA 
0.84452 0.4379 12.3885 0.0002 1.27529 0.2883 0.64548 0.5293 
 GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.91029 0.4117 0.53193 0.5952 5.03742 0.0102 0.81834 0.4479 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH 
0.92071 0.4077 6.50199 0.0063 2.0534 0.1392 0.03644 0.9642 
 GROSSSAVINGS does not Granger 
Cause DR 
1.21401 0.3117 32.007 0.0003 0.70396 0.5071 1.03572 0.3656 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GROSSSAVINGS 
0.67911 0.5149 22.0782 0.0009 1.31684 0.2914 1.15294 0.3274 
 AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 NA  NA 1.06613 0.3676 2.43247 0.0981 3.20328 0.0548 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED 
 NA  NA 0.74223 0.4917 1.06229 0.3533 1.55592 0.2275 
 INDUSTRYVALUEADDED does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 NA  NA 1.31498 0.296 1.31063 0.2788 4.34856 0.022 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
INDUSTRYVALUEADDED 
 NA  NA 0.3358 0.7197 0.61426 0.5451 1.11104 0.3424 
 Oman and Saudi Arabia do not show significant causal relationships under a level of 
significance of 5%, and in Qatar only the industry value added causes the dependency 
ratio (Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and economic development 
variables in Arab countries (set3): 
Country 
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 GDPPERCAPITA does not Granger 
Cause DR 
1.88423 0.164 2.3019 0.1505 0.02259 0.9777 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITA 
0.49156 0.615 1.90869 0.1986 2.94071 0.0638 
 GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.16862 0.8454 2.56534 0.1313 0.06235 0.9396 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH 
0.98988 0.3799 0.93368 0.4281 0.43353 0.6512 
 GROSSSAVINGS does not Granger 
Cause DR 
0.68712 0.5103  NA  NA 1.78787 0.1808 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GROSSSAVINGS 
0.09448 0.9101  NA  NA 0.02138 0.9789 
 AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED does 
not Granger Cause DR 
0.06478 0.9375 3.84843 0.0576 0.90099 0.4139 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED 
0.05106 0.9504 0.31167 0.7391 1.15765 0.324 
 INDUSTRYVALUEADDED does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.81034 0.4603 5.00046 0.0312 0.51552 0.6009 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
INDUSTRYVALUEADDED 
0.67732 0.5205 0.10423 0.902 0.68406 0.5101 
 
In Syria, the dependency ratio causes both the agriculture value added and the 
industry value added, and is caused by both the GDP per capita growth and the gross 
savings. In Tunisia, the dependency ratio has a double causality with the GDP per 
capita, and causes the gross savings besides the agriculture value added. No 
significant causal relationship is found for Sudan (Table 13). 
Table 13: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and economic development 
variables in Arab countries (set4): 
Country 
Sudan Syria Tunisia 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 GDPPERCAPITA does not Granger 
Cause DR 
1.1331 0.3302 0.90029 0.4143 23.0598 0.0000001 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITA 
3.01097 0.0582 1.13115 0.3325 3.6992 0.0326 
 GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH does not 
Granger Cause DR 
1.86361 0.1659 3.57893 0.0372 2.47182 0.0961 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH 
2.29794 0.1112 0.16293 0.8502 2.24945 0.1175 
 GROSSSAVINGS does not Granger 
Cause DR 
0.19891 0.8206 4.02624 0.0311 0.53702 0.5895 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GROSSSAVINGS 
1.4785 0.2431 0.54828 0.585 5.92516 0.0063 
 AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED does 
not Granger Cause DR 
0.85778 0.4302 0.97513 0.3985 1.43786 0.2484 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED 
0.06328 0.9388 4.68875 0.025 4.46925 0.0171 
 INDUSTRYVALUEADDED does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.26226 0.7705 1.20181 0.3264 0.41351 0.6639 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
INDUSTRYVALUEADDED 
0.25451 0.7764 5.54307 0.0148 0.63449 0.535 
 
For the United Arab Emirates, the GDP per capita causes the dependency ratio. This 
latter variable causes the GDP per capita in Palestine and Yemen. In addition to that, 
the dependency ratio causes the GDP per capita growth and the industry value added, 
and has a double causality with the agriculture value added in Yemen (Table 14). 
Table 14: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and economic development 
variables in Arab countries (set5): 
Country 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Palestine Yemen 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 GDPPERCAPITA does not Granger 
Cause DR 
5.10512 0.0113 0.21595 0.8081 0.12 0.8876 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITA 
0.22194 0.8021 6.08716 0.0108 4.67979 0.0215 
 GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.18327 0.8334 0.69199 0.5159 0.00907 0.991 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GDPPERCAPITAGROWTH 
0.03889 0.9619 0.03395 0.9667 6.5281 0.007 
 GROSSSAVINGS does not Granger 
Cause DR 
1.34034 0.2752 3.27025 0.0683 1.79739 0.2774 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
GROSSSAVINGS 
2.21346 0.1248 0.017 0.9832 1.69065 0.2937 
 AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED does 
not Granger Cause DR 
NA NA 0.6511 0.5356 8.8344 0.0018 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
AGRICULTUREVALUEADDED 
NA NA 0.19359 0.826 4.7801 0.0201 
 INDUSTRYVALUEADDED does not 
Granger Cause DR 
NA NA 1.42699 0.2708 1.59553 0.2276 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
INDUSTRYVALUEADDED 
NA NA 1.3612 0.2863 16.5513 
0.0000
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3. Granger causality between the dependency ratio and expenditure 
variables in Arab countries: 
Tables 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 summarizes the Granger causality tests between the 
dependency ratio and expenditure variables for Arab countries. 
In Algeria, the dependency ratio causes all expenditure variables. In Bahrain, the 
dependency ratio causes the expenditure on education and expenditure on public 
health and is caused by both expenditure on health and expenditure on private health. 
In Egypt, expenditure on education causes the dependency ratio that in return causes 
the per capita health expenditure. But for Iraq, the dependency ratio causes both 
expenditure on health and expenditure on public health (Table 15). 
Table 15: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and expenditure variables 
in Arab countries (set1): 
Country 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq 
F-
statistic 
Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
2.88865 0.0676 1.56466 0.2263 4.58607 0.0163 3.33573 0.0654 
DR does not Granger Cause 
EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE 
4.82626 0.0134 7.48523 0.0024 1.57063 0.2208 0.28721 0.7547 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI does 
not Granger Cause DR 
1.35466 0.2922 0.04075 0.9602 1.89165 0.1901 0.54825 0.6091 
DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI 
9.98162 0.0024 1.69704 0.2214 4.37011 0.0354 1.20347 0.3744 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
0.57262 0.5776 1.40392 0.2805 3.77459 0.0510 1.02486 0.4236 
DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE 
9.23765 0.0032 4.68898 0.0293 2.77309 0.0993 5.47027 0.0551 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC does not 
Granger Cause DR 
1.02009 0.3877 10.4611 0.0020 3.39403 0.0652 0.19601 0.8280 
DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC 
5.24425 0.0214 1.85744 0.1952 0.50235 0.6164 7.33882 0.0325 
HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
0.68923 0.5194 5.94642 0.0147 3.00773 0.0844 0.01834 0.9819 
DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL 
6.06894 0.0138 3.24259 0.0720 2.92841 0.0891 7.12945 0.0343 
 
No causal links are found for Kuwait. But for Jordan, the dependency ratio causes the 
expenditure on private health and is caused by both the expenditure on health per 
capita, and the expenditure on public health. For Lebanon, the dependency ratio has 
double causality with expenditure on education and is caused by expenditure on 
private health. In Libya, only the health expenditure per capita is caused by the 
dependency ratio (Table 16). 
Table 16: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and expenditure variables 
in Arab countries (set2): 
Country 
Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya 
F-statistic Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.43633 0.6495  0.21821 0.8051  7.42668 0.0039  0.46374 0.6676 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE 
 0.53617 0.5892  1.49037 0.2396  5.30389 0.0142  0.47123 0.6638 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 10.4369 0.0020  0.94462 0.4140  3.32509 0.0682  0.02506 0.9753 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI 
 3.47893 0.0616  1.41493 0.2780  1.74546 0.2131  15.8335 0.0003 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 2.58954 0.1131  0.36883 0.6986  7.47056 0.0069  2.69700 0.1048 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE 
 7.63402 0.0064  1.15969 0.3440  2.21442 0.1487  2.64530 0.1087 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 4.24118 0.0382  1.75740 0.2111  2.25420 0.1444  1.39212 0.2833 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC 
 2.61648 0.1109  2.80004 0.0975  3.13231 0.0776  1.25908 0.3164 
 HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.81247 0.4651  1.33682 0.2965  1.81395 0.2019  1.83006 0.1994 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL 
 2.21685 0.1485  1.92690 0.1850  1.57171 0.2447  1.47504 0.2647 
 
No causalities are found in Morocco and Qatar. But in Mauritania and Oman, the 
dependency ratio causes expenditure on education and per capita expenditure on 
health (Table 17). 
Table 17: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and expenditure variables 
in Arab countries (set3): 
Country 
Mauritania Morocco Oman Qatar 
F-statistic Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.86742 0.4282  0.09560 0.9090  0.68282 0.5111  0.07159 0.9311 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE 
 4.26359 0.0214  2.11403 0.1344  4.07823 0.0246  3.18897 0.0550 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.43575 0.6559  0.38249 0.6896  0.41435 0.6692  3.39823 0.0650 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI 
 4.55309 0.0317  3.77891 0.0508  6.82595 0.0094  0.75136 0.4911 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.09115 0.3647  1.13624 0.3509  1.04606 0.3791  1.97107 0.1788 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE 
 3.17892 0.0752  1.17163 0.3405  2.61864 0.1108  0.14703 0.8647 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.01488 0.3894  2.20050 0.1503  2.14166 0.1571  1.26849 0.3139 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC 
 1.74222 0.2136  2.81075 0.0967  0.99547 0.3960  0.58006 0.5737 
 HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.47329 0.2650  0.50097 0.6172  2.25823 0.1440  0.56674 0.5808 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL 
 2.55084 0.1163  3.66561 0.0546  0.60299 0.5618  1.86661 0.1938 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the dependency ratio causes per capita expenditure on health, and 
has a double causality with both the total expenditure on health and the expenditure 
on public health. In Sudan, the dependency ratio is caused by the per capita health 
expenditure, the total expenditure on health and the private expenditure on health. In 
the case of Syria, the dependency ratio only causes the per capita health expenditure 
(Table 18). 
Table 18: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and expenditure variables 
in Arab countries (set4): 
Country 
Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria 
F-statistic Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.24500 0.7839  0.84327 0.4380  1.41088 0.2592 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE 
 5.33424 0.0090  2.30321 0.1134  2.26220 0.1210 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.76121 0.4868  4.22832 0.0385  1.70444 0.2201 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI 
 0.36996 0.6978  1.24417 0.3203  3.97348 0.0450 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.34051 0.2956  4.76240 0.0281  2.16215 0.1547 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE 
 0.19431 0.8257  2.15839 0.1551  1.03892 0.3814 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 5.31039 0.0206  0.98504 0.3996  0.92385 0.4215 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC 
 4.92199 0.0256  0.26709 0.7697  1.59012 0.2411 
 HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 4.71238 0.0289  3.93343 0.0461  0.15328 0.8594 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL 
 5.05776 0.0237  1.76783 0.2094  2.00099 0.1747 
 
In Tunisia, the dependency ratio has a double causal relationship with expenditure on 
education and per capita health expenditure and causes expenditure on public health 
and total expenditure on health. For United Arab Emirates, the dependency ratio 
causes the per capita health expenditure. In Yemen, the dependency ratio causes all 
expenditure variables (Table 19). 
Table 19: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and expenditure variables 
in Arab countries (set5): 
Country 
Tunisia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Yemen 
F-statistic Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 5.76938 0.0064  0.06896 0.9337  0.81749 0.4565 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
EDUCATIONEXPENDITURE 
 4.14529 0.0233  2.16705 0.1541  9.25487 0.0016 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI 
does not Granger Cause DR 
 8.07525 0.0053  1.16059 0.3437  1.04771 0.3786 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPERCAPI 
 5.51114 0.0185  12.8139 0.0008  3.91078 0.0468 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE 
does not Granger Cause DR 
 3.28721 0.0699  1.07288 0.3705  0.76031 0.4872 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPRIVATE 
 2.73177 0.1022  2.52930 0.1181  5.10654 0.0231 
 HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC 
does not Granger Cause DR 
 0.28628 0.7557  1.03484 0.3828  0.16312 0.8512 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITUREPUBLIC 
 4.48444 0.0330  2.52347 0.1186  5.51677 0.0184 
 HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.42179 0.6645  0.12028 0.8876  0.38966 0.6849 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
HEALTHEXPENDITURETOTAL 
 4.64165 0.0301  0.29262 0.7511  9.84634 0.0025 
 
4. Granger causality between the dependency ratio and education 
variables in Arab countries 
Table 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 summarizes the results of Granger causality between the 
dependency ratio and education variables for Arab countries. 
For Algeria, the dependency ratio causes the secondary vocational and is caused by 
the primary education. In Bahrain, the dependency ratio is caused by both the 
secondary education and the secondary vocational. But for Egypt, the dependency 
ratio causes the secondary vocational and is caused by primary, secondary, and 
secondary general education. Iraq does not show and causalities (Table 20). 
Table 20: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and education variables in 
Arab countries (set1): 
Country 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
F-
statistic 
Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 5.57743 0.0075  3.00105 0.0639  5.22754 0.0111  2.16097 0.1548 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.89342 0.4177  0.15426 0.8577  0.47934 0.6237  0.54762 0.5911 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.54395 0.5859  4.18530 0.0235  12.3135 0.0001  1.84914 0.1965 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 0.90408 0.4153  0.97202 0.3883  0.18105 0.8354  1.09896 0.3623 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.81351 0.4525  4.14544 0.0242  2.51430 0.1050  1.42630 0.2754 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 5.54240 0.0088  1.70060 0.1973  4.08165 0.0318  1.67428 0.2254 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 3.22863 0.0517  1.34411 0.2739  11.5306 0.0003  2.94305 0.0882 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 1.73050 0.1920  1.78406 0.1829  0.16900 0.8455  0.79321 0.4731 
 
The dependency ratio is caused by primary education in Jordan, causes the secondary 
vocational in Kuwait and does not show any significant causal relationship in 
Lebanon and Libya (Table 21). 
Table 21: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and education variables in 
Arab countries (set2): 
Country 
Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 3.55994 0.0419  0.18357 0.8331  1.32612 0.2890  1.77685 0.2299 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.70894 0.5008  0.51137 0.6043  2.86224 0.0819  0.60062 0.5714 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.75193 0.1941  1.07582 0.3542  0.21761 0.8068  2.74609 0.1776 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 0.57779 0.5685  0.61244 0.5489  1.50197 0.2525  4.63039 0.0910 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.83844 0.1799  0.80907 0.4562  0.44588 0.6475  4.05713 0.0768 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 1.98753 0.1581  10.4614 0.0005  1.00338 0.3873  1.20509 0.3631 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.71389 0.2034  0.18996 0.8279  0.34601 0.7124  4.25965 0.1021 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 0.59793 0.5586  1.64415 0.2086  1.68211 0.2155  2.69772 0.1813 
 
In Mauritania, primary and secondary education cause the dependency ratio. But for 
Morocco, the dependency ratio causes the primary education and has a double 
causality with the secondary vocational. In Oman, the dependency ratio causes 
secondary education. And For Qatar, the dependency ratio is caused by secondary and 
secondary general education (Table 22). 
Table 22: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and education variables in 
Arab countries (set3): 
Country 
Mauritania Morocco Oman Qatar 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 5.96614 0.0056  0.33912 0.7145  3.10945 0.0583  1.06827 0.3537 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.64860 0.5285  7.08147 0.0024  1.93867 0.1604  0.48437 0.6198 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.42121 0.2648  0.12342 0.8843  2.94276 0.0681  3.39305 0.0450 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 4.15104 0.0311  2.55851 0.0918  6.51711 0.0045  0.71658 0.4954 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 3.15042 0.0766  4.69658 0.0156  2.19212 0.1345  0.92616 0.4056 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 3.70385 0.0533  4.06499 0.0259  0.97350 0.3928  0.08994 0.9142 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 0.01057 0.9895  0.83498 0.4417  2.82356 0.0752  3.46503 0.0424 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 1.27312 0.2916  2.35437 0.1087  2.53769 0.0959  0.82884 0.4449 
 
The dependency ratio causes the secondary education in Saudi Arabia and Sudan. It 
also causes the general secondary in Sudan. But for Syria, the dependency ratio 
causes the primary education and has a double causality with the secondary 
vocational (Table 23). 
Table 23: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and education variables in 
Arab countries (set4): 
Country 
Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 5.11616 0.1635  4.92458 0.0543  2.56326 0.0910 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 1.49030 0.4016  0.08123 0.9230  7.47732 0.0019 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.27606 0.7837  0.14376 0.8690  0.01011 0.9899 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 24.4012 0.0394  9.45981 0.0140  2.99724 0.0625 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 2.42762 0.2917  0.99438 0.4237  5.00656 0.0121 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 2.97214 0.2518  1.10996 0.3889  5.86441 0.0062 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
NA NA  0.19811 0.8254  0.03006 0.9704 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
NA NA  9.56880 0.0136  2.79518 0.0744 
 
In Tunisia, the dependency ratio causes the secondary education and is caused by all 
the remaining educational variables. But in the United Arab Emirates, only primary 
education that causes the dependency ratio. In the case of Palestine, the dependency 
ratio causes primary education and is caused by secondary and secondary general 
education (Table 24). 
Table 24: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and education variables in 
Arab countries (set5): 
Country 
Tunisia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Palestine 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 9.11918 0.0006  5.09156 0.0115  2.90826 0.0969 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 1.41609 0.2552  3.15830 0.0548  6.19143 0.0158 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 1.30625 0.2837  3.07039 0.0712  10.8915 0.0025 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 6.87628 0.0030  1.65597 0.2187  0.77085 0.4861 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
does not Granger Cause DR 
 4.96511 0.0143  1.49651 0.2505  2.95657 0.0938 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 0.38975 0.6808  2.35474 0.1235  3.66338 0.0604 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 3.89478 0.0300  3.09218 0.0701  14.5026 0.0008 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 2.91579 0.0678  1.49486 0.2508  0.47237 0.6356 
 
5. Granger causality between the dependency ratio and female 
participation in education in Arab countries: 
Tables 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 summarizes the Granger causality results between the 
dependency ratio for Arab countries. 
The dependency ratio is caused by the percentage of females in primary education and 
causes the percentage of females in secondary general education in Algeria. In 
Bahrain, the dependency ratio causes the percentage of females in both primary and 
secondary general education. For Egypt, the dependency ratio has a double causal 
relationship with the percentage of females in secondary education, and is caused by 
the percentage of females in primary and secondary general education. No causal 
links are found for Iraq (Table 25). 
Table 25: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and female participation in 
education variables in Arab countries (set1): 
Country 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 3.96006 0.0274  0.28352 0.7550  4.56060 0.0184  2.63332 0.1096 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 2.93851 0.0651  3.56039 0.0402  1.61658 0.2149  1.65610 0.2287 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.68922 0.1994  1.03381 0.3663  6.09246 0.0075  0.49632 0.6198 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 3.29784 0.0487  3.61855 0.0373  3.21543 0.0587  3.74875 0.0518 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 1.66584 0.2072  1.08914 0.3476  1.31426 0.2920  0.95179 0.4114 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 2.76043 0.0805  1.32656 0.2784  2.33530 0.1239  2.36677 0.1329 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.81811 0.4515  1.01115 0.3742  4.57172 0.0203  0.63833 0.5440 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 2.99210 0.0664  2.37677 0.1077  5.28546 0.0122  2.72972 0.1024 
 
In Kuwait, no causal links are found between the dependency ratio and female 
participation in education variables. But the dependency ratio causes the percentage 
of females in the secondary general education in Jordan, and causes the percentage of 
females in secondary education in Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya (Table 26). 
Table 26: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and female participation in 
education variables in Arab countries (set2): 
Country 
Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 1.62296 0.2153  1.11155 0.3411  0.96603 0.4031  3.26127 0.0921 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.97866 0.3883  1.39613 0.2618  1.16036 0.3400  0.03534 0.9654 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.85869 0.1818  3.20459 0.0535  1.32881 0.2942  2.34587 0.2118 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 5.34900 0.0138  1.67165 0.2035  1.86587 0.1890  4.87740 0.0846 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.96227 0.3969  0.30349 0.7408  0.24242 0.7876  0.43180 0.6764 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 2.32015 0.1208  1.22573 0.3100  1.98703 0.1695  3.06178 0.1561 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 2.09036 0.1447  0.78141 0.4672  0.22777 0.7990  4.74584 0.0879 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 6.12852 0.0068  1.13578 0.3350  5.40380 0.0171  12.5176 0.0190 
 
Mauritania does not show significant causalities between the dependency ratio and 
female participation in education variables. But in Morocco, the dependency ratio has 
a double causality with percentage of females in primary education, and causes both 
the percentage of females in secondary and secondary general. In Oman, only the 
percentage of females causes the dependency ratio. This latter variable causes the 
percentage of females in primary education, and has a double causality with the 
percentage of females in secondary vocational (Table 27). 
 
Table 27: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and female participation in 
education variables in Arab countries (set3): 
Country 
Mauritania Morocco Oman Qatar 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 0.37669 0.6893  3.78248 0.0318  1.98600 0.1538  0.96357 0.3907 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.66796 0.5202  3.84139 0.0302  0.07600 0.9270  3.60965 0.0367 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 3.11224 0.0591  0.01298 0.9871  3.42793 0.0466  0.20774 0.8134 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 0.45225 0.6405  10.1575 0.0003  0.94002 0.4026  1.85086 0.1722 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.66523 0.5308  0.86818 0.4286  1.27920 0.2991  9.66246 0.0013 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 3.59482 0.0572  0.18187 0.8345  0.19887 0.8212  3.84122 0.0397 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 0.26868 0.7672  0.74671 0.4820  3.12499 0.0596  0.19069 0.8272 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 3.47682 0.0517  4.80950 0.0149  2.38358 0.1107  0.71202 0.4976 
 
The dependency ratio causes the percentage of females in primary education in 
Sudan. No causal relationships are found in Saudi Arabia and Syria (Table 28). 
Table 28: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and female participation in 
education variables in Arab countries (set4): 
Country 
Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 6.07706 0.1413  1.13470 0.3820  2.29104 0.1157 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.59347 0.6276  6.55827 0.0309  0.76871 0.4711 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 1.75865 0.3625  0.76179 0.5072  1.99212 0.1512 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 1.23384 0.4477  0.60864 0.5746  0.09008 0.9141 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL does 
not Granger Cause DR 
 0.51808 0.6587  0.03675 0.9641  1.92840 0.1601 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 1.32677 0.4298  0.25673 0.7817  2.64393 0.0848 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
NA NA  0.71312 0.5274  2.13724 0.1327 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
NA NA  0.35022 0.7180  0.68012 0.5129 
 
In Tunisia, the dependency ratio is caused by the percentage of females in primary 
education, and causes the percentage of females in secondary general. In the United 
Arab Emirates, the dependency ratio is caused by both the percentage of females in 
primary and secondary general education while in Palestine, the dependency ratio 
causes both the percentage of females in secondary and secondary vocational (Table 
29). 
Table 29: Granger causality of the dependency ratio and female participation in 
education variables in Arab countries (set5): 
Country 
Tunisia United Arab Emirates Palestine 
F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
 PRIMARY does not Granger Cause 
DR 
 3.30936 0.0473  3.87622 0.0302  0.17635 0.8406 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
PRIMARY 
 0.03706 0.9637  2.21462 0.1243  1.47413 0.2709 
 SECONDARYGENERAL does not 
Granger Cause DR 
 2.36767 0.1090  3.73340 0.0440  1.41833 0.2831 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYGENERAL 
 4.12311 0.0249  1.64996 0.2198  2.92036 0.0961 
 SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
does not Granger Cause DR 
 2.20345 0.1342  0.26547 0.7698  1.60488 0.2446 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARYVOCATIONAL 
 0.90974 0.4172  3.13499 0.0679  6.07943 0.0167 
 SECONDARY does not Granger 
Cause DR 
 3.20154 0.0578  0.93059 0.4146  1.13284 0.3570 
 DR does not Granger Cause 
SECONDARY 
 1.74131 0.1959  0.10437 0.9015  2.82324 0.1024 
 
V. Implied Policies and Discussion  
Arab countries have decreasing trends of fertility rate and mortality rate that have 
resulted in the most recent decades in an increase of the working age population, or 
the population of the age group 15-65. The dependency ratio, that explains the 
working age population in terms of the dependent population, also has decreasing 
trends. Still, if the dependency ratio is divided into the young dependent ratio and 
elder dependency ratio, the trends of the elder ratio is slightly increasing, as the 
number of the population over the age 65 is increasing because of the enhancement of 
healthcare in the Arab economies. 
All of the following resulted in the occurrence of the demographic dividend in Arab 
countries. These economies are divided into two groups where the first set of groups 
is characterized by a positive value of the demographic dividend, which is not the 
case of the second group of countries. 
In Algeria, the demographic dividend started in 1970 and ended in 2015. In this 
country, the change in the demographic composition led to the increase of the female 
and youth labor force, but at the same time, it decreases the total unemployment. In 
addition to that, the dependency ratio causes the increase in the enrolment in 
vocational secondary education, with emphasis on females. With regard to the 
government expenditures, the dependency ratio also caused the increase of education 
expenditure besides the increase in both public and private health expenditure. And 
while the GDP per capita causes the GDP per capita growth, it is also caused by both 
the government gross savings and the agriculture value added. 
These findings align with the contribution of Furceri (2012) that states that both the 
rigid labor market and the relative low-output employment elasticity are the main 
factors behind the high unemployment, mostly among the youngest segments. But for 
the contributions of Bardak (2014) and ETF (2012), they indicate that political 
violence and social instability in this country are mainly because of the discrimination 
of females in the job market besides the high rates of unemployment and low training 
and education systems. 
Policy implications requires that policy makers should target specific groups of youth 
in Algeria such as early school leavers and the NEETs, increase job supply, enhance 
the general and vocational education quality, in addition to the increase of policies 
that allow self-employment (Bardak, 2014). 
In the case of Bahrain, the demographic dividend started in 1975 and is still 
occurring. The dependency ratio seems to cause the agriculture value added, the 
expenditure on education and the expenditure on private health. Furthermore, the 
increase in the working age population led to the increase of female enrolment in 
primary and secondary general education. 
The economy of Bahrain is heavily reliant on oil, but due to declining oil reserves, 
challenges remain in diversifying economic sectors within this country. Still, Bahrain 
was successful in developing tourism, banking, and agriculture sectors in these recent 
decades (ILO,2006). 
Even if this country has a strong economy, the Bahrain Center for Studies and 
Research indicates that almost 6% of the workforce that are unemployed are Bahraini 
nationals. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs tackles this latter issue besides 
youth inclusion throughout the program “A Strategy for Employment and Integration 
of the National Workforce in the Labour Market in Bahrain”. (ILO, 2006) 
The Bahraini Government also included an unemployment insurance that includes 
free healthcare in both private and public sectors.  
In Bahrain, policy makers should also target specific groups in, mostly early school 
leavers that are a major concern in this country. In addition to that, both the quality of 
education and training should be enhanced and monitored throughout coordination 
between the provided educational and training programs, and the private sectors. 
Finally, and even if females reached higher rates of participation in both the job 
market and education in Bahrain, more efforts are still needed. Policy makers should 
put strategies to include women more in the job market besides reducing the gap of 
the wage difference between males and females (ILO, 2006). 
For Egypt, the demographic dividend ended in 2005. The dependency ratio in this 
economy causes the unemployment under a significant level of 10% and causes the 
industry value added and the expenditure on private health under a significance level 
of 5%. In addition to that, the dependency ratio led to an increase in the enrolment in 
secondary vocational education besides the increase in the female participation in 
secondary education. 
According to Ghafar (2016), the problem of unemployment is of prime importance in 
Egypt. For this, there should be policies and programs that will increase the job 
supply. These policies should be targeting specific groups, mostly young graduates.  
In the case of Iraq, the demographic dividend ended in 1980. The dependency ratio 
causes the female labor force, the public health expenditure, and the total health 
expenditure. 
The economic situation of Iraq is a result of the political conflicts and war (Katzman, 
2013; Katzman & Humud, 2016). But for this economy to be fast growing, Al Basri 
and Al Sebahi (2013) indicate that oil and gas legislation and regulatory reforms 
should be approved besides employment and educational reforms. 
In Jordan, the demographic dividend ended in 1970, still the population change 
resulted in the increase of total unemployment. In addition to that, the dependency 
ratio causes the expenditure on private health, female enrolment in both secondary 
education and secondary general education. 
Even if the population change led to more female participation in both education and 
employment, the issue of unemployment still exists. This is why policy makers should 
put more programs to attain lower unemployment rates. 
In Kuwait and Mauritania, the demographic dividend started in 1980, and 2005, 
respectively, but the demographic change indicates no causalities are found. 
These two economies need to make reforms, strategies, and programs that will focus 
on the youth at this stage to make profit from the demographic dividend as this latter 
is in its early stage. Focus should be on human capital, education, health, and job 
supply. 
For Lebanon, the demographic dividend ended in 1980. The dependency ratio in this 
economy causes the increase of the total labor force, unemployment of young 
females, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, gross savings, expenditure on 
education, and the female enrolment in secondary education. 
In Lebanon, the issue of the females’ marginalization still exists, mostly among the 
youth. For this, the Lebanese government should put policies that will enable the 
enhancement of female inclusion. 
In Morocco, the demographic dividend started in 1980 and is still occurring with 
positive trends. The demographic transition causes the total unemployment, youth 
participation in the labor force, and the unemployment of both young males and 
young females. And with regard to education variables, the dependency ratio causes 
the enrolment in primary education, secondary vocational education, female 
participation in primary, secondary general, and secondary education. 
The contribution of CITI foundation (2014) indicates that there is a lack of investment 
in the young Moroccans that resulted in the social and economic exclusion of this 
segment of the population. Even if there are projects for youth inclusion such as the 
partnership between the Moroccan government and the World Bank, efforts still need 
to be made. Policy makers should put strategies and programs of youth inclusion in 
addition to the creation of additional investment as well as the creation of microloans 
to encourage innovative enterprises within this economy. Furthermore, there should 
be coordination between public and private sectors, in both the job market and 
educational institutions to reduce the gap of the skills learned in schools and the skills 
required by employers. Focus should also be on targeted groups such as the NEETs. 
In Oman, the demographic dividend started in 2010 and is still occurring. In this 
country, the demographic transition causes the total labor force, youth participation in 
labor force, expenditure on education, and expenditure on health per capita. In 
addition to that, the dependency ratio also causes enrolment in secondary education. 
Oman shows that the population change is having a positive economic impact. For 
this, policy makers should maintain the strategies in work and enhance the public 
sector in both education and health. 
In the case of Qatar, the demographic dividend existed since 1960. But for the 
dependency ratio, it causes the youth participation in the labor force, and female 
participation in both primary and secondary vocational education. 
In Saudi Arabia, the demographic dividend started in 1990 and is still occurring with 
a positive trend. The demographic transition causes the total labor force, female labor 
force, expenditure on education, and expenditure on total and public health. 
Furthermore, the dependency ratio causes the enrolment in secondary education. 
In Sudan, the demographic dividend only happened in the period between 2000 and 
2015. The dependency ratio in this economy causes total labor force, female labor 
force, and youth participation in labor force. Concerning education, the dependency 
ratio causes the increase in the enrolment in secondary and secondary general 
education as it causes the increase of female participation in primary education. 
For Syria, no demographic dividend is found. But the demographic transition causes 
the total labor force, female labor force, and youth participation in labor force, 
agriculture value added, industry value added, and health expenditure per capita. The 
dependency ratio also causes the primary and secondary vocational education. 
For Syria, strategies should relate to creating more job opportunities in the growing 
sectors with more inclusion of the youngest segment. 
For Tunisia, the demographic dividend started in 1970 and had increasing trends until 
2005. This demographic dividend is still occurring but with a negative pattern. In 
Tunisia, the demographic transition causes the total labor force, the youth 
participation in the labor force, the GDP per capita, the gross savings, the agriculture 
value added, expenditure on education, expenditure on health per capita, and 
expenditure on public health. For the education variable, the dependency ratio causes 
the increase in the secondary education enrolment and the increase in the female 
participation in general education. 
In the United Arab Emirates, no demographic dividend is found starting the period of 
1965. In this economy the demographic transition accounts for the causality of total 
labor force, total and young female unemployment, and health expenditure per capita. 
This country has the same issue as Lebanon, which relates to the social exclusion of 
women. Thus, the United Arab Emirates policy makers should put strategies that will 
enable the inclusion of young females besides maintaining and enhancing the current 
strategies. 
In Palestine, the demographic dividend is found only for the period between 1995 and 
2005. But the dependency ratio causes the female labor force, and the youth labor 
force besides GDP per capita. With regard to education variables, the dependency 
ratio causes enrolment in primary education and female participation in secondary 
vocational education. 
The economic situation and the poverty levels within this economy is mainly a result 
of its political situation (CITI foundation, 2014). 
In Yemen, the demographic dividend was in the period between 1975 and 2010. The 
dependency ratio causes the total labor force, the total unemployment, the young 
female unemployment, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, industry value added, 
agriculture value added, expenditure on education, and expenditure on both public 
and private health.  
As the population change has a direct impact on both industrial and agricultural 
sectors, Yemen should create more investment in these sectors to ensure job supply. 
In addition to that, policy makers should also put into work programs and strategies 
that will enhance the human capital in this economy with focus on youth, mostly 
females. 
Emphasis should be on countries in which the demographic dividend recently 
occurred or is still occurring to take advantages of the population change to achieve 
economic growth. These countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia. Policies that must be standardized in order to 
achieve high economic growth among all of these economies should relate to health, 
human capital, education, and job supply.  
For health policies, investment and government should be towards the public health 
sector to ensure medical care to the population and to strengthen health systems 
within these economies. But for educational policies, focus should not only be on 
increasing its access, but there should be coordination between education programs, 
training programs, and the job market, in order to ensure a better use of the human 
capital. 
Other policies should target identifying economic sectors and industries that are 
among the growth phase, promote pro-growth policies, and expand both national and 
international investment. This is to ensure a supply of both skilled and unskilled labor. 
VI. Conclusion 
In the shorter and medium runs, demographic dividends can be still attractive for 
countries and economies and mostly for those sectors that are under quasi-autarky. 
But, the longer terms prospects appear to be playing in favor of economies that are 
open, interdependent and globalized. Migration and relocations of people, are also 
important factors that need to be considered when seeking new opportunities of 
change. In this context, Arab economies appear to be concerned with the global 
changes including demographic dividends, but the rate of shifts from traditional 
demographic structures seem to be very low in some economies. This implies that 
more research on demographic dividend is needed both globally and locally to better 
predict future demographic and economic trends. Collaboration with other scientists 
in other fields of knowledge is also highly needed to better understand the human 
impacts of series of future projects.  
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